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Abstract 
The array of existing studies have focused on the effect of changes to sovereign ratings on 
bond prices, equity prices, spreads, default swaps, economic growth, investments, etc. This 
paper seeks to fill the gap in literature; it aims to quantify the effects that changes to 
sovereign credit ratings have on interest rates in emerging market economies. With the use of 
a system GMM model, we find that an upgrade of one notch in foreign currency sovereign 
credit ratings leads to a 0.35% decrease in interest rates. A one notch upgrade therefore, has 
minimal impact on interest rates. Whereas a one notch downgrade in ratings leads to a 0.51% 
increase in interest rates. The results are robust after accounting for endogeneity, use of 
alternate specification, macroeconomic factors that affect interest rates and sovereign ratings 
revisions. We conclude that changes in long term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings 
impact on interest rate through the risk premium which decreases (increases) after an upgrade 
(downgrade). The effects are larger for a downgrade than that experienced following an 
upgrade. Future studies can consider the use of additional control variables for: financial 
liberalization, financial crisis, investor protection and quality of institutions. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background   
The reliance on sovereign credit ratings to provide indicators for country credit worthiness in 
international financial markets has become of significant importance. Several emerging 
market economies like South Africa, Brazil, Russia, China, Greece, and Argentina to mention 
a few, have seen downgrades to their sovereign ratings in recent years. Previous studies 
(Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007; and Chen et al. 2013) assert that changes to sovereign ratings 
affect financial markets through the cost of capital. This paper focuses on emerging markets 
and developing countries because they are usually characterised with high budget deficits and 
information asymmetry.  Therefore, sovereign credit ratings are of heightened importance, 
due to the fact that they provide lenders with material information that determines the cost 
and terms of financing arrangements.  
The recent spate of sovereign credit rating downgrades shows how important it is to examine 
the effects that changes to ratings have on a country’s ability and cost of raising funds. 
Merton (1974) explains that a higher risk premium is associated with lower credit ratings, 
thereby raising interest rates. This increases debt servicing costs, and negatively affects 
economic performance, thus putting strain on national budgets leading to reduced spending 
and higher deficits. Emerging market and developing economies seldom have the capacity to 
withstand these adverse increased costs of accessing funds in international markets. The 
citizens in negatively rerated countries are forced to bear the brunt through increased cost of 
debt financed consumption. 
Previous studies (Kaminsky and Schumkler, 2002; Chen et al., 2016) show that downgrading 
(or upgrading) a sovereign may have a drastic impact on stock prices and bond yields via cost 
of capital. This study goes beyond previous studies by quantifying the impact on interest rates 
brought about by changes of sovereign credit ratings and providing key information for 
policy makers. The study will sample an array of emerging markets, by analysing what the 
impact of changes instituted by ratings agencies have on interest rates. 
Reinhart (2002) details the importance of sovereign credit ratings in determining a countries' 
access to international capital markets and the terms of such finance obligations. In his study 
that surveys determinants of sovereign ratings; Afonso (2003) states that the relevance of 
rating the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers stems from the fact that governments are 
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the largest issuers of debt instruments in capital markets. Therefore, sovereign ratings are 
seen as indicators of public and private sector financial wellness.  
Afonso (2003) further argues that classification of sovereign public debt goes beyond a 
measure of the solvency and capacity of interest payment and return of loans; to an 
assessment of the economic, financial, and political situation of an economy and a measure of 
a country's development. In addition, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) explain that when a 
country’s credit rating is downgraded, all debt instruments in that country will likely get 
downgraded in light of the sovereign ceiling doctrine. This makes it extremely costly and 
difficult for commercial banks and corporations that have been downgraded to sub-
investment grade in line with the host country to participate in international markets. 
This study seeks to quantify the impact of sovereign ratings changes, be it positive or 
negative, on interest rates. This in turn informs how such changes impact on returns and 
prices of equities and bond prices, etc. By running regressions on factors that inform ratings 
changes, the results obtained will provide a set of quantified indicators. These indicators will 
provide a degree of measure for which policy makers in emerging economies will be able to 
rely upon, so as to improve that country’s macroeconomic management in lieu of improved 
sovereign risk levels, marked economic growth and favourable credit ratings. Furthermore, 
the study hopes to aid asset managers with policy formulation and regulation and indeed 
individual investors. 
The study will sample nine emerging market economies, covering the major regions in the 
world over a period of 20 years from 1996 to 2006. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The problem exists in that there is a lack of research that specifically deals with the impact of 
sovereign ratings changes on interest rates. Previous studies (Kaminsky and Shumkler, 2002; 
Rowland, 2004; Cantor and Parker, 1996; Chen et al., 2016) have focused on the effect of 
changes of sovereign credit ratings on bond prices, equity prices, spreads, default swaps, 
economic growth, investments, etc. Yet the problem remains in that limited studies have been 
conducted to quantify the effect on interest rates that arise as a result of changes to a 
sovereign’s credit rating. 
Sovereign credit ratings convey views of ratings analysts (Amadou, 2002; Erdem and Varli, 
2014) about a country’s economic and political condition. Investors use this information as an 
indication of a country’s willingness and ability to meet debt obligations. Sovereign credit 
ratings are of particular importance in emerging markets because they attract (Chen et al. 
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2013; and Chen et al., 2016) investments and capital flow. Negative ratings; increase the cost 
of capital, which burdens government budgets and private investment, putting a strain on 
economic activity. 
This paper attempts to quantify the effect that changes to sovereign credit ratings pose on 
interest rates in emerging markets. The paper will assess how changes to sovereign ratings 
affect the risk premium, which in turn affects interest rates. The study will take into 
consideration various variables that determine sovereign ratings revisions, when analysing 
the impact on risk premium and interest rates. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to quantify the impact that Sovereign Ratings Changes 
(upgrade or downgrade) have on Interest rates and fill the gap in research. This study will 
adopt a system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) on panel data, to run estimation 
regressions on an extended version of the Taylor rule. According to (Chen et al. 2013; and 
Chen et al., 2016) the GMM system helps to alleviate endogeneity in the estimation model 
hence results are more robust than other models obtained such as a simple OLS. The equation 
details functions of interest rates in an open market economy with a focus on emerging 
markets. The equation will also include determinates of sovereign credit ratings.  
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What is the effect of changes to sovereign credit ratings and to what extent do 
these changes affect interest rates in emerging market economies? 
2. Are these effects of sovereign credit rating changes on interest rates asymmetric? 
1.5 Hypothesis 
i. Sovereign credit ratings have an impact on interest rates in emerging market 
economies. 
ii. Sovereign credit ratings are asymmetric. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 deals with the definition of sovereign credit ratings as a measure of a country’s 
credit risk from a theoretical view point. The chapter reviews the interplay between ratings 
changes and interest rates on financial assets. In addition, the chapter covers determinates of 
sovereign credit ratings in emerging markets, with results obtained from empirical studies. 
Determinates of sovereign credit ratings are used later on, as variables in chapter 3. Criticism 
levelled against rating agencies and the corresponding link between ratings changes and 
financial crisis are covered in 2.3. 
2.2 Understanding Sovereign Credit Ratings  
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) explains that the objective of a sovereign credit rating is to 
determine a country's overall risk or creditworthiness. This is drawn from a government's 
willingness and ability to meet its obligations in accordance with the debt issue terms. 
Sovereign credit ratings are issued by Credit Ratings Agencies (CRA’s), which are for-profit 
organisations providing specialized credit assessments for debt issued by corporates and 
countries alike. According to Ponce (2012) CRA’s perform a dual role of certification 
through ratings of security issues and dissemination of asymmetric information between 
investors and borrowers. 
Bissondoyal-Bheenick (2005) describes sovereign credit ratings as a mechanism of assessing 
each government’s ability and willingness to service its debts in full and on time. Edem and 
Varli (2014) suggest that ratings are particularly important in that they provide investors with 
signals which help to attract capital inflow and investments, especially for emerging markets.  
The importance of sovereign credit ratings extends beyond a governments ability to raise 
capital, Christopher et al. (2012) to financial intermediaries, corporations, etc. Due to the fact 
that changes to credit ratings impact on all debt assets such as bonds and equities through 
increased cost of capital. While bond holders may suffer a decrease or increase in returns 
depending on the nature of the change to the rating. Enterprises are affected via changes in 
cost of capital that impacts investments and profitability. 
Cantor and Parker (1996) explains that credit rating agencies seldom assign higher ratings to 
borrowers of the same nationality such as a local municipality, provincial government, or 
private corporates than those assigned to the home country. As a result when a country’s 
sovereign debt rating is amended all debt instruments in the affected country may have to be 
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revised especially in the case of a down grade, which can be explained by the sovereign 
ceiling doctrine.  
With the ever growing globalisation of financial markets, credit ratings have become 
prominent features in financial arrangements. According to Becker and Milbourn (2011) such 
agreements may have special clauses entrenched in them that require that investments be 
recalled in an event that the borrower gets downgraded below a given level. In addition, state-
run pension funds or mutual funds for instance may impose restrictions on fund managers to 
invest in certain assets based on their credit rating; such restrictions will normally preclude 
investments in assets rated as junk.  
While a large number of ratings agencies exists globally, the lead assigners of sovereign 
credit ratings used for purposes of this study are Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
(S&P). Moody's, and S&P dominate the credit ratings market, accounting for nearly 80% of 
global credit ratings market. Ratings are indicators for relative risk and may vary from time to 
time based on economic cycles, political factors, etc. Table 1 illustrates the various symbols 
employed by leading ratings agencies, with a brief classification for each category. It is 
important to note here that Fitch and S&P utilise the same ratings codes. 
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Table 1, Credit Rating Symbols 
Rating Symbols For Long-Term Debt     
Interpretation Moody's Standard & Poor's Fitch 
  
  
  
INVESTMENT GRADE RATINGS 
 
  
  
  
  
Highest Quality Aaa AAA AAA 
  
  
  
High Quality Aa1   AA+   AA+ 
  Aa2 AA AA 
  Aa3   AA-   AA- 
  
  
  
Strong payment capacity A1 A+ A+ 
  A2                 A                 A 
  A3 A- A- 
  
  
  
Adequate payment capacity Baa1   BBB+   BBB+ 
  Baa2 BBB BBB 
  Baa3   BBB-   BBB- 
  
  
  
SPECULATIVE-GRADE RATINGS 
 
  
  
  
  
Likely to fulfil obligations, ongoing  Ba1   BB+   BB+ 
uncertainty Ba2 BB BB 
  Ba3   BB-   BB- 
  
  
  
High-risk obligations B1   B+   B+ 
  B2 B B 
  B3  B-  B- 
  
  
  
Subject to very high credit risk Caa1   CCC+   CCC+ 
  Caa2 CCC CCC 
  Caa3  CCC-  CCC- 
  
  
  
Near default, with little prospect of  Ca CC CC 
recovery of principal and interest C C C 
  
  
  
Typically in default with little prospect of 
 
  
recovery of principal and interest D D 
Source: www.globalratings.net 
    
Table 2 illustrates the current long term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings. In addition 
the table provides the comprehensive number of revisions in the year that the country gets 
rerated over the sample period. In a year that a country gets rerated, the study records only 
the first revision to ratings in that year. 
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Table 2, Country Ratings and Ratings Revision History 
Sovereign Ratings           
  Country Ratings as at end of 2017 Ratings Revisions 
Country Moody's S&P Fitch 
Upgrades 
since 1996 
Downgrades 
since 1996 
Total Changes 
Brazil Ba2 BB- BB 7 3 10 
Chile Aa3 A+ A 4 1 5 
China A1 A+ A+ 3 1 4 
India Baa2 BBB- BBB- 3 1 4 
Malaysia A3 A- A- 3 2 5 
Mexico A3 BBB+ BBB+ 4 0 4 
Russia Ba1 BB+ BBB- 6 4 10 
South Africa Baa3 BB B 3 3 6 
South Korea Aa2 AA AA- 6 1 7 
      Total 39 16 55 
Source: www.countryeconomy.       
 
    
 
2.3 Criticism levelled against Credit Rating Agencies 
With a growing importance of credit ratings in the global economy; CRA’s have seen a boom 
in their business owing to the fact that lenders require critical signals of likelihood of defaults 
by borrowers. Ratings agencies are purported to provide such information to lenders and 
investors. However, rating agencies have come under immense scrutiny following their role 
in the recent global financial crisis that started in 2008. The crisis was triggered by a collapse 
of the subprime mortgage market in the USA and developed into a colossal banking crisis 
with a collapse of heavyweight Investment Bankers Lehman Brothers and costly bail-outs for 
several other financial institutions.  
According to Hirth (2014) investors investing in corporate and government bonds in the USA 
at that time were misled by ratings agencies that issued inflated ratings to what was otherwise 
bad debt. The unfolding events that lead to the subprime mortgage crisis proved otherwise. 
This led to questions over the legitimacy of ratings, issued by ratings agencies. 
Manso (2013) acknowledged the criticism levelled against the ratings business which is seen 
to be infested with conflicts of interest. He explains that this results from the payment 
structure in which agencies are paid for their service by the bond issuers, rather than 
investors. The conflict arises from the fact that credit rating agencies may harbour interests in 
securing long term business from the issuers of debt that seek favourable ratings. This may 
result in the loss of integrity of ratings issued by CRA’s. 
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Haspolt (2015) classifies the criticisms levelled against ratings agencies as being; a lack of 
transparency in their grading methodology, a lack of competition in a market dominated by 
the three leading agencies, an income model that raises a conflict of interest for ratings 
agencies, failure of ratings agencies to anticipate a crisis and a propensity to deepen existing 
crisis. 
2.4 Determinants of Sovereign Credit Ratings in Emerging Markets 
In a seminal study by Cantor and Parker (1996) in which they analysed eight determinants of 
sovereign ratings namely; Per Capita Income, GDP Growth, Inflation, Fiscal Balance, 
External Balance, External Debt, Economic Development and Default History for a sample 
comprising of 49 both developed and developing countries. They found six factors to be 
statistically significant namely; per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, the 
indicator variables for economic development and default history. However, fiscal policy and 
external balances were statistically insignificant and the reason for this stems from the fact 
that; countries seeking favourable credit standing may tend to favour conservative fiscal 
policies, and the supply of international capital may be limited for countries with low credit 
ratings. 
Canuto (2004) provides similar findings for factors that determine sovereign risk to those 
presented by Cantor and Parker (1996) vis-à-vis; high per capita income; high economic 
growth; low total external debt/current account receipts ratio; low central government gross 
debt/ total fiscal receipts ratio; low inflation rate; a lack of default events in the past 30 years. 
In addition, Canuto (2004) found a prominent level of commercial openness as provided by 
trade flows to be significant. Rowland (2004) argues that ratings agencies use similar factors 
when rating both developed and developing countries. In his study, he found that the 
following factors were significant in determining credit ratings; GDP per capita and the debt 
ratio, growth rate, inflation rate.  
In a more recent study conducted by Haspolat (2015) in which an analysis of Moody’s 
methodology of grading countries was conducted, the study found that; GDP per capita, 
governance quality, current account balance, growth performance and growth expectations, 
being a developed country and having a reserve currency impacted sovereign credit rating 
positively. While exchange rate volatility, interest payments, debt stock and default 
occurrences were the factors affecting credit ratings negatively. 
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The study therefore adopts an intersection set of factors from the various studies above, 
which include; GDP per Capita, GDP growth rate, Inflation, Debt ratio, Level of Economic 
Development and Default history. 
2.5 Transmission effects of sovereign ratings changes  
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) found that the rating agencies provide financial markets with 
new and tradable information. In addition, changes to bond ratings also impact stocks 
although the reaction has different signs. After an upgrade, bond market returns are positive 
while a downgrade has a discernible impact on equity and bond returns and the effects of 
rating announcement are significantly asymmetric. The impact on equity returns is more 
visible in the presence of low foreign currency debt, rising inflation and low fiscal balance. 
While the impact on bond returns following a downgrade is more noticeable when the 
economy is in contraction as evidenced in emerging market economies which are 
characterised with high inflation, and low current account. 
The above phenomenon can be explained with theoretical background in economics, whereby 
a change in sovereign ratings alarms investors of a possible default. In the case of a 
downgrade, investors will seek a higher compensation for the new risk level. This is based on 
the premise that investors arrive at estimates for compensation to assume risk greater than the 
risk-free rate. Therefore, in a bond valuation an increase to risk premium increases investor’s 
expected required rate of return. Higher rate of return increases the value of the bond, 
because the numerator becomes larger in value than the denominator yield to maturity. This 
will increase the bond value for bond holders but renders new purchases of bonds expensive.  
In the case of equities, the impact on the value of stocks has an inverse relationship to that on 
bonds. Almeida et al. (2017) explains that an increase in interest rates will lead to increased 
cost of capital, which in turn leads to reduced expenditure by firms and less returns as a result 
of increased financing costs. This will lead to a drop in the equity value. Furthermore, Chen 
et al. (2016) assert that unregulated outflow of capital, following a ratings downgrade will 
lead to increased cost of capital which will hamper credit. This in turn will slow down 
economic activity and possibly lead into a recession. The opposite is true for positive credit 
rating revisions. 
Changes to sovereign credit ratings affect other debt instruments domiciled in the rerated 
country. Research has shown that credit rating changes to foreign denominated currency 
bonds also affect stock markets in that country. Kamisnky and Schmukler (2002) explain this 
as emanating from government’s decision to amend policy in order to neutralise the effects of 
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a downgrade which leads to increased cost of capital. Governments may seek to raise 
additional tax which affects the future profitability of corporations leading to a loss of value 
of their stocks. 
Furthermore, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) found that for emerging markets changes to 
credit ratings cause cross-country contagion in that the effects of changes to one country are 
felt in its neighbouring countries. In addition, the authors found that upgrades tend to happen 
in rallies and downgrades happen in economic contractions, leading to the contentions that 
credit rating agencies contribute to instabilities in emerging markets. Emerging markets are 
mentioned here because they tend to have problems of information asymmetry. Therefore, 
when ratings provide new information about a country, the effects tend to be magnified. 
2.6 Impact of sovereign ratings changes on interest rates 
Changes to sovereign ratings upgrades or downgrades affect interest rates via the risk 
premium that investors seek as compensation for taking on risk. If a country gets downgraded 
for instance, lenders or fund managers may seek to relocate their investments to safer 
investment countries. The downgraded country looking to access foreign funds will pay a 
higher interest rate as a result of heightened default risk. 
Chen et al. (2013) provide an explanation as to how sovereign credit rating changes can 
affect the cost of capital and impede investment through the risk premium. They explain that 
if a country’s risk cannot be entirely diversified away, then a risk premium is necessary to 
cover for associated country risk. In addition, capital flows resulting from changes to 
sovereign credit ratings may limit the liquidity of financial markets in the case of a 
downgrade and therefore a risk premium is required. In both instances real private investment 
will see a reduction or increase for a downgrade or upgrade respectively. 
According to Brooks et al. (2004) in the formation of international portfolios a range of 
fundamental inputs are analysed which may affect the top–down choice of the basic 
allocation of funds to different regions and national markets. Paramount is the change of 
sovereign ratings which is a fundamental event that may trigger substantial re-weighting of 
international portfolios which may subsequently lead to capital flight. 
Finnerty et al. (2013) assert that markets anticipate ratings changes, and this is more 
prevalent for downgrades than it is for upgrades. The reasoning behind their assertions is that 
severe credit monitoring by credit ratings agencies enables the agencies to issue warnings 
ahead of rating change announcements. These warnings are significant enough to cause a 
ratings change. As a result, when the actual announcement is delivered the impact on bond 
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prices is insignificant. The impact of the announcement is magnified for lower rated countries 
in sub-investment categories than their counterparts in investment categories. 
Most literature has focused on the impact that changes to sovereign credit ratings have on; 
credit default swaps (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Finnerty et al., 2013), financial 
intermediaries, bonds and stock returns (Kaminsky and Schumkler, 2002; Brooks et al. 2004) 
private investment (Chen et al. 2013) and economic growth (Chen et al. 2016). 
This study seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge by going beyond previous research 
and quantifying the effect that changes to sovereign credit ratings (upgrades or downgrades) 
have on interest rates in emerging market economies. The study employs a panel data of nine 
emerging market economies over from 1996 to 2016. The countries included in the sample 
are Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia Federation, South Africa and South 
Korea. These countries have been selected as a representation of the world’s emerging market 
economies. The countries are picked from all major global regions and include the BRICS 
nations. According to Marten et al. (2014), BRICS nations account for approximately 25% of 
the world’s land mass, with nearly half of the world’s population. The results from this study 
will therefore provide results that can be reliable upon when analysing all emerging markets. 
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3 Chapter Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 defines the model and specifications used to derive an approximate measure of the 
impact that changes to sovereign credit ratings have on risk premium and interest rates.  Two 
landmark equations are used to derive estimating tools for both risk premium and interest 
rate; these are Uncovered Interest Rate-Parity and Taylor Rule respectively. The chapter 
further provides detailed explanations of determinates of sovereign credit ratings used to 
augment the two landmark equations. 
3.2 Impact of sovereign ratings changes on risk premium 
Ratings agencies assign a particular score depending on the country’s credit default risk. 
Therefore, the starting point of this study is to define a method to measure the effects of 
revisions to sovereign credit ratings on risk premium. This paper will use the uncovered 
interest rate parity to extract the risk premium. The uncovered interest rate parity can be 
stated as follows; 
                                             𝑒𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 +  𝑟𝑡
𝑓 +  𝜌𝑡 −  𝑟𝑡                                                  (1) 
Where 𝑒𝑡  is the current exchange rate, 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 is the expected future exchange rate, 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
 is the 
foreign risk free rate, 𝜌𝑡 is the risk premium and 𝑟𝑡 is the required rate of return. 
Mohanty and Klau (2004) explain that shocks to exchange rates usually represent temporary 
deviations from the long-run value. This can be explained by the fact that central banks are 
likely to respond to changes in exchange rates by altering interest rates, therefore exchange 
rates are said to be mean reverting. Bringing the future exchange rate to the left hand side of 
the equation will lead to the cancelling out of the future and current exchange rates. 
Therefore, rewriting this equation leads us to the second equation; 
                                                𝑟𝑡  =𝜌𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
                                                                                (2) 
In equation (2) a shock resulting from a ratings downgrade for example, leads to an increase 
in the required risk premium  𝜌𝑡 . This tells us that the risk premium is paramount in 
determining interest rate, albeit not the only factor. This study seeks to estimate the impact of 
ratings announcements through changes to risk premium on interest rate.  
In order to estimate the impact of sovereign ratings announcements on risk premium, this 
study augments equation (2) to include the following explanatory variables;  
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          𝜌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽
𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑 +  𝛽𝑢𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑢 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                               (3) 
Where 𝜌𝑖,𝑡−1 is the risk premium given in equation (2) at period zero, the variables that affect 
credit rating from literature are given as  𝑋𝑡, a variable for downgrades 𝐷𝑡
𝑑 , a variable for 
upgrades 𝐷𝑡
𝑢 , and error term 𝜀𝑡. A system Generalised Method of Moments will be used to 
run panel data regressions on equation (3). 
3.3 Impact of sovereign ratings changes on interest rate 
The study proceeds to estimate the effect of sovereign credit ratings changes on interest rate, 
the study will utilise the Taylor Rule (standard open economy reaction function), which 
assesses the determining factors for interest rate (r at time t) in emerging market economies 
as given by Mohanty and Klau (2004). 
The Taylor Rule equation given in Taylor (2001), is augmented to include the variables for an 
upgrade  𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑢  and a downgrade  𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑  for announcements made at time t, in country i, 𝛼0 is a 
constant and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Furthermore, 𝛼 when used on ratings revisions is given as a 
binary value 0 to denote no occurrence and 1 for occurrence of a comprehensive rating 
change in a year, while ∅ is a coefficient that estimates the significance of the explanatory 
variable. The equation is therefore written as follows: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  ∅𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝜋𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝑦𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝑒∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼0 + 𝛼
𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑 +  𝛼𝑢𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑢 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (4) 
Where 𝑟𝑡 is given as the nominal interest rates, (𝜋𝑡) is annual rate of inflation, (𝑦𝑡) is the 
output gap, (𝑒𝑡 ) is log level of real effective exchange rate, and ∆ is the first difference 
operator. The variables will be measured at an annual frequency. In addition to the variables 
given in Taylor rule, equation (4) is expanded to include dummies for two variables prevalent 
in literature that determine sovereign credit ratings changes. These are Level of Economic 
Development and Default History. 
 
Level of economic development and default history are measured by a dummy variable using 
a binary value. Where 0 represents no default history and 1 represents the presence of a 
default on debt obligations for a sample nation in the last 30years. In the case of Level of 
economic development 0 represents countries that are classified as undeveloped and 1 
represents countries that are in transition or developed. The study adopts the United Nations 
Country classification for level of economic development and Moody’s default history data, 
collected over the last 30 years.  
 Therefore rewriting equation (4) leads us to equation (5):  
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ∅𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝜋𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝑦𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅𝑒∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑋𝑡
𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛼0 + 𝛼
𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑 +  𝛼𝑢𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑢
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … (5) 
A system GMM will be utilised to run country specific regressions on equation (5). 
∑ 𝑋𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑋1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 
      𝑋2𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
3.4 Sovereign credit ratings determinants 
GDP per capita is the total output of a country given as an average measure of peoples 
earning in a particular country, it is used as a measure of living conditions in the geographical 
area being sampled. According to Cantor and Parker (1996) higher earnings lead to a higher 
tax base which represents the country’s ability to payback debt, which in turn serves as a 
proxy for political stability. 
GDP Growth Rate measures a country’s economic growth per annum. Cantor and Parker 
(1996) suggests that a high economic growth rate signals a country’s trajectory towards 
positive fiscal balance and is therefore likely to service debt obligations with relative ease. 
Inflation is a proxy for price increases and currency devaluation, in light of rising inflation 
rates. Central banks in emerging market economies try to maintain a steady level of inflation 
rate by using contractionary monetary policy. Cantor and Parker (1996) and Rowland (2004) 
explain that a high rate of inflation indicates structural anomalies in the government’s 
finances. This is evidenced by a country’s inability to meet budgetary expenses with money 
collected from taxes or attained through the issuance of government bonds. Monetary policy 
altering aimed at stimulating capital flow will lead to a rise in inflation. This short term fix 
raises living costs for citizenry and results in possible political instability. 
External Debt Ratio; the study uses total external debt to exports ratio as defined Canuto 
(2004) as a measure of external debt. Canuto (2004) asserts that the wider the gap between 
total external debts of a specific country in relation to its ability to attract foreign currency 
through export of goods and services. The more burdensome it becomes to meet foreign debt 
obligations. A high debt ratio signals the likelihood of default. The debt ratio rises when the 
country’s external debt increases more than its exports or local production. 
Economic development; Cantor and Parker (1996) explain the inclusion of economic 
growth, by stating that rating agencies appear to factor a benchmark for which a certain level 
of economic development erodes the possibility of default risk. Therefore, a proxy for 
economic development is a simple indicator variable. The variable is used as a bilateral 
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classification of a country by the United Nations (as shown in table 3), to show whether a 
country is industrialised or not. 
Table 3, UN Country Classification 
Country Name Country Code UN Country Classification 
Brazil BRA Developing economies 
Chile CHL Developing economies 
China CHN Developing economies 
India IND Developing economies 
Korea, Rep. KOR Developing economies 
Mexico MEX Developing economies 
Malaysia MYS Developing economies 
Russian Federation RUS Economy in transition 
South Africa ZAR Developing economies 
United States USA Developed economy 
Source: United Nations Data Bank 
  
Default history, a country that has defaulted on its debt obligation in the recent past is 
deemed a credit risk. Beers and Nadeau (2015) provide two examples of sovereign default; 
the first is failure to meet a contractual obligation to pay interest or principal when they fall 
due to lenders (external or internal). The other is a failure by a state to meet payments on debt 
that has been guaranteed by the state where clear payment dates have been outlined. The 
study uses a dummy variable with a binary figure to demonstrate default history for the 
sample countries within the last 30 year period. Where the figure 1 represents a default in the 
last 30 years and 0 represents no default history. 
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4 Description of Data and Econometric Technique  
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of data, data sources, units of measure and data 
frequency. The estimation models used on panel data described in 4.2 are covered in 
subsection 4.3. 
4.2 Descriptive statistic results 
Table 4 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables pertaining to the research 
sample of emerging market economies. We derived panel data for the period 1996 to 2016 for 
our test variables. Table 4 below shows an increase in risk premium as well as nominal 
lending rates and inflation over the periods spanning 1996 to 2000. This period encompasses 
the Asian financial crisis of 1998 which caused contagion in the Asian region, which forms a 
significant part of our sample. In addition Brazil was going through a period of hyperinflation 
brought about by a combination of structural features of that economy. According to Volpon 
(2016) the volatile in Brazil’s inflation lead to increased policy rate instability, as a result; 
real rate continued to rise due to increased demand for a risk premium.  
 
Yamazawa (1998) asserts that the Asian crisis started in Thailand with the collapse of the 
Bhat, as Thailand aimed to peg the local currency to the US dollar. The country ran low on 
foreign currency reserves causing a collapse of the local currency and the crisis spread as a 
result of financial contagion in the region. 
 
Similarly the risk premium as well as nominal rates peaked from a 2007 level of 4.9% and 
12.96% for risk premium and nominal rates respectively. To 9.18% and 14.27% in 2008 for 
risk premium and nominal interest rates respectively. The period was characterised by the 
global financial crisis that followed the collapse of subprime mortgages in the United States 
of America. According to Utt (2008) the failure in USA market subprime mortgage led to 
economic and financial market contractions globally. Utt (2008) further asserts that the result 
came about as ‘high default risk’ housing loans were repackaged and traded at higher 
unwarranted ratings, which eventually collapsed when the rate of default increased thus 
driving global economy in to a contraction. 
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Table 4 Annual means for empirical data 
Year 
Risk 
Premium 
Nominal 
Rates 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Debt 
Ratios 
Inflation 
Output 
Gap 
Exchange 
Rates 
1996 29,95% 38,22% -375,84 5,73% 4,39% 15,37% -4,55% 1,90% 
1997 15,23% 23,67% 34,99 5,34% -0,76% 8,24% 0,69% -3,35% 
1998 18,74% 27,09% -786,67 0,64% 9,55% 9,33% -9,79% -3,68% 
1999 15,44% 23,43% 115,34 5,02% 2,00% 13,61% -3,64% 2,44% 
2000 8,76% 17,99% 441,02 6,57% -25,60% 6,06% 3,56% -0,71% 
2001 9,38% 16,31% -165,73 3,31% -1,77% 5,98% -3,36% -0,92% 
2002 10,97% 15,65% 220,74 4,52% -2,28% 5,46% 0,36% -0,18% 
2003 11,16% 15,28% 458,36 4,89% -10,40% 5,68% 6,28% 0,72% 
2004 8,85% 13,19% 655,71 6,52% -15,86% 4,15% 7,66% 2,57% 
2005 7,25% 13,44% 858,55 5,90% -13,60% 4,64% 8,82% 1,55% 
2006 5,12% 13,08% 926,83 6,88% -2,85% 4,33% 10,04% 0,86% 
2007 4,91% 12,96% 1059,96 7,09% 2,09% 4,86% 13,90% -0,85% 
2008 9,18% 14,27% 355,30 4,39% -6,30% 7,72% 4,60% -1,17% 
2009 9,44% 12,69% -912,23 0,13% 18,33% 4,73% -10,83% 3,75% 
2010 7,34% 10,59% 1826,29 6,76% -3,31% 4,63% 20,49% 0,63% 
2011 8,16% 11,41% 1345,84 5,29% -2,56% 5,37% 13,77% -0,54% 
2012 7,42% 10,67% 118,12 4,26% 11,13% 4,34% -3,97% 0,24% 
2013 6,13% 9,38% 411,90 3,83% 5,44% 4,58% 0,07% -0,80% 
2014 6,60% 9,85% 19,96 3,47% 4,39% 4,64% -4,16% -1,76% 
2015 7,91% 11,17% -1407,97 2,48% 8,18% 5,04% -20,11% -1,44% 
2016 8,42% 11,93% -89,84 2,36% 7,75% 4,84% -4,49% -1,60% 
Table 5, presents mean annual empirical data for the emerging market economies used in the sample for the period from 
1996 to 2016.  
 
4.2 Data Description 
The data for Sovereign Credit Ratings for long-term debt is derived from Moody’s, S&P & 
Fitch. According to Chen et al. (2016) S&P is the most active of three major CRA’s and the 
results are least anticipated. However, the study found more rating revisions data from Fitch 
and Moody’s than that available from S&P for our emerging markets sample and period. In 
order to ensure robustness of results, the study used an average of ratings revisions from both 
Moody’s and Fitch. The study looks to eliminate lagged bias in results by only recording the 
first comprehensive revision in the year that a country gets rerated. 
The sample is comprised of comprehensive upgrades and downgrades of long term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating revisions over a twenty year period from 1996 to 2016 for 
nine emerging markets that are a representation of the major global regions. This paper 
adopts similar methods to those used by Chen et al. (2016) in the construction of a model to 
estimate the effect of changes in sovereign credit ratings on interest rates. 
Data is collected for nominal interest rates, macroeconomic factors that determine interest 
rates and sovereign ratings changes. In addition, we utilise dummy variables for ratings 
revisions, default history and level of economic development. The data is obtained from 
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various sources including; Federal Reserve Economic Data, World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), DataStream, the United Nations Statistics Division and Bruegel which is a 
European think tank specializing in economics. Table 4 provides a detailed description of the 
data used in our estimation, the sources and units of measure. 
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Description of Variables and Data Source 
 
Table 5, Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Name  Definition  Unit of Measurement Data Sources 
Determinants of Sovereign Ratings    
      
Per capita income  GDP per capita 1996-2016  Thousands of US dollars  World Bank Data 
      
GDP growth  
Annual real GDP growth on a 
year-over-year basis, 1996-
2016 
Percent  IMF 
      
Inflation  
Average annual consumer 
price inflation rate, 1996-
2016 
Percent  
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
  
  
  
External debt  
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services and 
primary income) 1996-2016 
Percent  World Bank Data 
      
Indicator for economic 
development  
UN Country Classification as 
an industrialized country as 
of September 2015 
Indicator variable: 1 = 
industrialized;    0 = not 
industrialized 
United Nations 
      
Indicator for default history  
Default on foreign currency 
debt since 1990 
Indicator variable: 1 = 
default;              0 = no 
default 
Moody’s 
  
  
  
Determinants of Interest Rates 
 
  
  
  
  
Short term interest rate Lending interest rate (%) Percent World Bank Data 
   
 
  
Output gap 
The deviation of actual GDP 
from potential output.  
Percent 
DataMarket, World 
Bank Data 
   
 
  
Real effective exchange rate 
This the log level of the real 
effective exchange rate where 
an increase means an 
appreciation and vice versa 
Percent Bruegel 
   
 
  
Other Variables 
  
  
  
  
  
Moody’s, and Fitch average, 
checked against S&P ratings  
Ratings assigned as of 
January 01, 1996, by 
Moody’s or Fitch, or the 
average of the two agencies’ 
ratings 
B1(B+)=3; Ba3(BB-)=4; 
Ba2(BB)=5;...Aaa 
(AAA)=16 
Moody’s, S&P & Fitch 
Source: Various data sources as indicated in the data sources column 
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4.3 Econometric Technique 
When estimating the effects of sovereign credit ratings revisions on interest rates, the changes 
to interest rates may be endogenous to revisions to sovereign credit ratings. This is because 
credit rating revisions bring rise to changes in interest rates. According to Chen et al. (2016) 
endogeneity may also occur as a result of an omitted variable or variables that exist or occur 
at the same time such as economic reforms or market sentiments. As such a correlation may 
exist between changes to ratings and the error term, leading to biased estimated coefficients.  
To negate the effects of endogeneity, the study utilised a panel data approach as described by 
Bond (2002), a system GMM and a difference-in-differences (DID) technique. The DID 
technique is conducted by studying the differential effect that sovereign credit ratings 
changes have on interest rates. The technique calculates the effects of rating revisions on 
interest rates before and after the rating event. 
The study commences by checking for stationarity in the data collected, this was done by 
running an Augmented Dicky Fuller Test (Unit Root Test). The study then ran regression on 
equation (3) to estimate the effect of ratings revisions on risk premium using a system GMM. 
In order to estimate the effects of changes in sovereign credit ratings on interest rates; the 
study used a difference-in-differences model and then moved on to run separate regressions 
on equation (5), using a system GMM model. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
The study adopts various techniques to ensure robustness of the baseline results to alternate 
specifications and stationarity of results in Table 9. The study makes use of non-overlapping 
data from two leading ratings agencies Fitch and Moody’s; to analyze the effects of sovereign 
credit rating revisions on the rerated country’s interest rates. The study further takes into 
account alternative estimates by including dummy variables for; level of economic 
development and default history. The results are robust following the techniques detailed 
above, evidence that revisions in sovereign credit ratings do affect the interest rates in 
emerging market economies. 
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5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 details empirical results obtained from two estimation models, a system GMM and 
difference-in-differences technique. The chapter commences with a panel data estimation 
using a system GMM to analyse the effects of sovereign credit ratings on risk premium. 
Estimations for the effects of sovereign ratings changes are covered in 5.3 and 5.4. 
Subsection 5.3 employs a difference-in-differences technique to analyse pre and post ratings 
effects of ratings revisions on interest rates. Subsection 5.4 provides results for estimation of 
effects of ratings revisions on interest rates from a panel data regression using a system 
GMM. 
5.2 Relation between risk premium and sovereign credit rating revisions 
Effects on Risk Premium using system GMM 
Table 5 presents the estimation results obtained from system GMM on panel data regressions 
using equation (3). Four panel data regressions were run to determine the relationship 
between revisions in sovereign credit ratings and risk premium. The study derived an average 
from the regression results (1) to (4). The study found that upgrades have an inverse 
relationship on risk premium as expected. A one notch positive rating revision resulted in 
0.3% decrease in risk premium for the sample of emerging markets over the 20 year period. 
A negative rating revision has a direct relationship with risk premium as expected. This 
means that a negative rating change will result in higher risk premium. The results also show 
that a one notch negative revision will result in 6.0% increase in risk premium. The results 
are statistically significant at all levels and in line with literature Chen et al. (2016). 
Our finding are consistent with Cantor and Parker (1996), confirming that downgrades have a 
more significant impact than upgrades. Furthermore, the study confirms evidence in 
emerging markets that negative sovereign ratings lead to a higher risk premium. This can be 
explained by the fact that investors seek a higher return when investing in more risky assets. 
While an upgrade reduces the required risk premium, the level of compensation is not 
asymmetric to that required by investors following a downgrade. Therefore, downgrades can 
lead economies that are in a recession into deeper crisis as suggested by Kaminsky and 
Schumkler (2002). 
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Table 6, System GMM estimation on risk premium 
Relation between credit rating revisions and risk premium using Generalised Method of Moments 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean 
Constant 0.027*** -0.102** 0.011 0.206*** 0.036 
 (0.007) (0.043) (0.009) (0.005)  
Upgrade 0,002 0,0278*** 0,028*** -0,068*** -0,003 
  (0,006) (0,008) (0,008) (0,004)   
Downgrade 0,062*** 0,057*** 0,057*** 0,066*** 0,060 
  (0,011) (0,013) (0,013) (0,004)   
Risk Premium (-1) 0,591*** 0,665*** 0,665*** 
 
0,640 
  (0,046) (0,055) (0,055) 
 
  
Inflation (-1) 0,116 0,234*** 0,234*** 
 
0,195 
  (0,082) (0,085) (0,085) 
 
  
GDP Per Capita (-1) -0,000** -0,000* -0,000* 
 
0,000 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
 
  
GDP Growth (-1) -0,162** -0,070 -0,070*** 
 
-0,101 
  (0,080) (0,123) (0,123) 
 
  
External Debt Ratio (-1) 0,023 0,056*** 0,056*** 
 
0,045 
  (0,016) (0,019) (0,019) 
 
  
EconDev=0 x DefaultHistory=0 
 
0,113** 
 
-0,078*** 0,017 
  
 
(0,046) 
 
(0,003)   
EconDev=1 x DefaultHistory=1 
  
-0,113 
 
-0,113 
  
  
0,046 
 
  
Dummies No Yes Yes Only   
Specification Tests 
    
  
Chi-square p-value 0,920 0,909 0,891 0,998   
R-squared 0,685 0,720 0,720 0,058   
Observations 72 72 72 72   
Note: Table 5 presents regression results estimated using a system generalised method of moments. The dependent 
variable is the annual risk premium rate. The instruments are Level of Economic Development and Default History. All 
sets of regression results include a constant term as reported. Upgrade is a comprehensive sovereign credit rating 
revision in the year of a positive revision. Downgrade is a comprehensive negative sovereign credit rating revision in the 
year of the revision. GDP per Capita is a comparison of a country's GDP on its purchasing power parity basis divided by 
population. GDP growth is measured as the average annual real GDP growth on a year-on-year basis. External Debt 
Ratio is measured as external debt stocks taken as a percentage of (exports of goods, services and primary income). 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis, level of significance is denoted by (10%*, 5%** and 1%***) 
 
5.3 Relation between interest rate and sovereign credit rating revisions 
Effects on Interest Rates using difference-in-differences technique 
The study commences with an estimation of the effect of changes in sovereign credit ratings 
on interest rates, with a difference-in-differences technique as suggested by Chen et al. 
(2016).  The approach is intended to remove biases and endogeneity in pre and post-rating 
amendments relative to interest rates. In addition, it seeks to eliminate biases that may have 
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arisen from other events when drawing comparisons between rating revisions to interest rates 
levels. 
Table 7Table 6 presents mean and median annual interest rates from the sample of emerging 
markets collected over a 20 year period. The results given in the table are broken-down into 
two sample panels, the first being a full sample of ratings changes and the second is a 
subsample which only considers rating changes that result in rating revisions of two or more 
notches. The results for upgrades and downgrades are analysed separately for prior and post 
rating revisions. Data availability and ratings events dictate the number of observations used 
in this analysis. The findings demonstrate significant increases in interest rates following 
positive rating revisions.  
In the first panel, the average annual interest rate is 21.1% for the three years preceding a 
positive rating change. While the three year post-rating interest rate average is at 16.2%. The 
average difference between the two periods is -4.9%, which is statistically significant at a 5% 
level according to a t-test. The three year average interest rate prior to a downgrade in 
sovereign credit ratings is 19.58%. While the three year post-negative rating revisions is 
19.45%, a difference -0.135% which is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
The negative sign on the mean difference in interest rates for the three year prior and three 
year post negative revision was unexpected. The results obtained from a difference-in-
differences model, seem to suggest evidence that central banks manage to narrow the 
predictable effect on interest rates following a downgrade through monetary policy 
amendments. However, effects on interest rates following a positive rating revision do not 
attract similar interventions. This can be explained by the fact that positive revisions bring 
about stimulants for economic growth, through reduced cost of capital which in turn 
stimulates private investments as explained by Chen et al. (2013). 
Furthermore, from the results obtained the study shows significantly large percentage 
differences between pre and post revisions. This can be explained by the high interest rates 
experienced in Brazil between 1994 and 2002. The exceedingly high nominal interest rates 
resulted from contractionary monetary policy employed by the Brazilian central bank in order 
to control hyperinflation. In that period, the Brazilian Central Bank raised the prime lending 
rate so high, that real fixed income debt yielded returns in excess of 20%.   
The results for the five year prior and post rating periods for both upgrades and downgrades 
are similar to those from the three year duration periods. Thus positive credit rating changes 
are synonymous with reduced nominal interest rates in emerging markets. While evidence 
shows that downgrades for the countries sampled and period show a minor decrease in 
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nominal interest rate following a negative sovereign credit rating revision. The negative sign 
can be attributed to outliers in the sampled data. 
 
Table 7, Difference-differences model estimation 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
First Panel: Entire Sample       
          
  3-year-prior-
rating 
3-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
3-year-prior-
rating 
3-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
Mean 0.211 0.162 -0.049** 0.196 0.194 -0.001*** 
Median 0.208 0.161 -0.046** 0.184 0.181 -0.002** 
Ratings 
Revisions 
39 39   13 13   
          
  5-year-prior-
rating 
5-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
5-year-prior-
rating 
5-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
Mean 0.209 0.163 -0.047** 0.229 0.190 -0.040** 
Median 0.198 0.159 -0.039** 0.233 0.180 -0.053* 
Ratings 
Revisions 
34 34   6 6   
          
Second Panel: With revisions resulting in larger than one notch 
  
  
          
  3-year-prior-
rating 
3-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
3-year-prior-
rating 
3-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
Mean 0.270 0.185 -0.084* 0.126 0.100 -0.025** 
Median 0.278 0.181 -0.097* 0.126 0.100 -0.026** 
Ratings 
Revisions 
4 4   4 4   
          
  5-year-prior-
rating 
5-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
5-year-prior-
rating 
5-year-post-
rating 
Difference 
Mean 0.357 0.169 -0.188     
Median 0.304 0.169 -0.136     
Ratings 
Revisions 
4 4   4 4   
Note: Table 6 presents three year and five year mean interest rates prior to and post positive and negative ratings changes. 
The first panel is a full sample consisting of all ratings changes while the second panel is a sub-sample with only ratings 
changes larger than 1 notch. The variations between pre and post rating revisions are examined with the use of a t-test. 
Level of significance is denoted by (10%*, 5%** and 1%***). 
Effects on Interest Rates using system GMM 
Table 8 shows results obtained from panel data regressions using a system GMM model, for 
the relationship between nominal rates and sovereign credit ratings revisions. The findings 
show that following a positive rating revision, interest rate levels are set to increase by 
0.958%. The results are significant at 5% significance level and the coefficient show that 
impact of upgrades on interest rates is minimal. The positive sign for the coefficient is not in 
line with literature Chen et al. (2016), who found that upgrades lead to lower interest rates 
(bond yields). An analysis of data on nominal interest rates could explain the misspecification 
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due to outliers of nominal interest rates from data collected on Brazil over the sample period. 
The observed high interest rates were brought on by contractionary monetary policy 
following periods of hyperinflation in that country.  
The results following a downgrade are synonymous with previous literature Chen et al. 
(2016) who found that following downgrade interest rates had a negative coefficient. With 
results showing that a one notch negative rating revision results in 3.22% increase in nominal 
interest rates, significant at all levels. The results affirm similar further findings from studies 
conducted by Kaminsky and Schumkler (2002) and Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007). They 
found that downgrades lead to increased bond spreads as presented in the literature review. 
An upgrade in ratings will lead to an increase in equity prices and capital flows into the 
rerated country, paving the way for heightened investments as a result of reduced cost of 
capital. In the event of a downgrade, interest rates increase as a result of increased default risk 
as signalled by CRA’s and bond spreads will increase. 
The regression results show statistically significant coefficients at all levels and with 
correctly specified signs for; lagged nominal interest rates, output gap and real effective 
exchange rates. Inflation has a negative coefficient and is insignificant when analysing 
regression results for equation (4) the Taylor Rule equation. The results are otherwise 
significant at 5% level of significance when regressed in the augmented Taylor Rule. The 
results suggest that a rise in inflation will lead to a decrease in interest rates. The results for 
inflation are different form those obtained by Mohanty and Klau (2004) who found a positive 
correlation between inflation and interest rates. The negative coefficient seems to suggest a 
strong presence of contractionary monetary policy over the sample period. 
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Table 8, System GMM estimation on nominal interest rates 
Relation between credit rating revisions and interest rate using Generalised Method of Moments  
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean 
Constant 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)  
Upgrade 
 
0.011** 0.006 0.012*** 0.010 
  
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)   
Downgrade 
 
0.035*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.032 
  
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)   
Nominal Interest Rates (-1) 0.995*** 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.007*** 1.002 
  (0.058) (0.046) (0.056) (0.051)   
Inflation (-1) -0.062 -0.103** -0.145** -0.098** -0.102 
  (0.044) (0.041) (0.080) (0.041)   
Out-put Gap (-1) 0.011** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.053 
  (0.0045) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)   
Real Effective Exchange Rate(-1)  -0.210*** -0.098*** -0.064 -0.094*** -0,117 
  (0.027) (0.033) (0.071) (0.031)   
EconDev=0 x DefaultHistory=0 
   
0.003 0.003 
  
   
(0.007)   
EconDev=1 x DefaultHistory=1 
  
0.006 
 
0.006 
  
  
(0.007) 
 
  
Dummies No Yes Yes Yes   
Specification Tests 
    
  
Chi-square p-value 0.910 0.451 0.656 0.520   
R-squared 0.940 0.938 0.946 0.946   
Observations 81 81 81 81   
Table 7, presents regression results estimated using a system generalised method of moments. The dependent variable is 
the annual nominal interest rate. The instruments are Level of Economic Development and Default History. All sets of 
regression results include a constant term as reported. Upgrade is a comprehensive sovereign credit rating revision in the 
year of a positive revision. Downgrade is a comprehensive negative sovereign credit rating revision in the year of the 
revision. Inflation is measured as the average annual consumer price inflation rate. Output Gap is given as percentage 
being the deviation of actual GDP from potential output. Effective exchange rate is measured as the log level of the real 
effective exchange rate where an increase means an appreciation and vice versa. Standard errors are given in parenthesis, 
level of significance is denoted by (10%*, 5%** and 1%***) 
 
Effects on Interest Rates using system GMM without Brazil 
Without dispelling the findings above, we conducted a second set of regressions excluding 
Brazil from the data set, the estimation results are presented in Table 8. From a set of four 
regressions, the study derives an average estimation for the effect of ratings revisions on 
interest rates. Taking into account various macroeconomic factors present in the Taylor Rule, 
level of economic development and default history. The study finds that a one notch upgrade 
in ratings for emerging markets leads to a 0.35% decrease in interest rates. A one notch 
downgrade leads to 0.51% increase in interest rates. The results for a downgrade are 
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statistically significant at 10% level of significance when using an augmented Taylor Rule 
with variables for ratings changes only. 
The coefficient on interest rates is statistically significant and the signs are correctly 
specified. An upgrade in ratings will lead to increase in bond spreads denominated in the 
currency of the rerated country. This will attract capital flows into the rerated country, paving 
the way for heightened investments as a result of reduced cost of capital. In the event of a 
downgrade, interest rates increase as a result of increased default risk as signalled by CRA’s.  
The results obtained after omitting Brazil show all variables now poses coefficients with 
correctly specified signs. Lagged nominal rates have a positive sign and on average account 
for 81% of movements in nominal interest rates in emerging markets. Inflation has a positive 
coefficient and found to have no significance in determining nominal interest rates in 
emerging market economies. Output gap was found to have a positive coefficient and 
statistically significant at all levels. Finally, exchange rates were found to have a negative 
coefficient and statistically significant at levels. The results are robust following a change in 
specifications of control variables. 
The results from the study excluding Brazil in the sample confirms findings by (Kaminsky 
and Schumkler 2002; Pukthuanthong-Le et al. 2007 and Chen et al 2016). That downgraded 
countries, experience increased costs of capital and that upgrades lead to a decrease in 
interest rates. The effects of downgrades are therefore, capital flight, higher cost of capital in 
international markets, among other things. This leads to lower investments in the rerated 
country, as the heightened cost of capital makes new investments and servicing of current 
obligations much more expensive. A downgraded country will also experience lower 
government spending, leading to higher levels of unemployment, higher living expenses, etc. 
All of these adverse factors will lead downgraded country to lower economic growth and the 
possibly into an economic downturn.  
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Table 9, System GMM estimation on Nominal Interest Rates Excluding Brazil 
Relation between credit rating revisions and interest rate using Generalised Method of Moments    
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean 
Constant 0.013*** 0.006* 0.009** 0.01** 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
 
Upgrade 
 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  
(0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 
 
Downgrade 
 
0.008* 0.004 0.003 0.005 
  
(0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 
 
Nominal Interest Rates (-1) 0.765*** 0.860*** 0.812*** 0.812*** 0.821 
 
(0.062) (0.004) -0.087 (0.087) 
 
Inflation (-1) 0.029 0.038 0.026 0.026 0.049 
 
(0.046) (0.051) -0.067 (0.067) 
 
Out-put Gap (-1) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate(-1)  -0.168*** -0.146*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.165 
 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.052) (0.052) 
 
EconDev=0 x DefaultHistory=0 
   
-0.009 -0.009 
    
(0.005) 
 
EconDev=1 x DefaultHistory=1 
  
0.009 
 
0.009 
   
(0.005) 
  
Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Specification Tests 
    
 
Chi-square p-value 0.756 0.751 0.764 0.764 
 
R-squared 0.742 0.728 0.739 0.739 
 
Observations 81 81 81 81   
Note: Table 8 presents regression results estimated using a system generalised method of moments. The dependent variable 
is the annual nominal interest rate. The instruments are Level of Economic Development and Default History. Upgrade is a 
comprehensive sovereign credit rating revision in the year of a positive revision. Downgrade is a comprehensive negative 
sovereign credit rating revision in the year of the revision. Inflation is measured as the average annual consumer price 
inflation rate. Output Gap is given as percentage being the deviation of actual GDP from potential output. Effective 
exchange rate is measured as the log level of the real effective exchange rate where an increase means an appreciation and 
vice versa. Standard errors are given in parenthesis, level of significance is denoted by (10%*, 5%** and 1%***) 
Unit Root Tests 
From the raw data collected it was noted that; inflation, GDP per Capita and GDP growth for 
Brazil and India were non-stationary. The study treated the data by running a first difference 
to achieve stationarity. Table 9 below shows results for raw data in the fourth column and 
results after differencing to order 1 are in column five. 
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Table 10, Unit Root Test 
Panel data unit root test: annual data 
 
  
 Variables  
ADF-Fisher Chi-
square 
 ADF-Choi Z-stat  
Before 
differencing 
After differencing 
 Inflation  100,87*** -7.50*** I(1) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 GDP per Capita  67,82*** -5,66*** I(1) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 GDP Growth  75,22*** -5,88*** I(1) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 Exchange Rates  84,35*** -7,02*** I(0) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 External Debt 
Ratio  
67,33*** -6,16*** I(0) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 Nominal Rates  33,53*** -2,61*** I(0) I(0) 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
 
  
 Output  Gap  64,28*** -5,39*** I(0) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 Risk Premium  54,80*** -4,62*** I(0) I(0) 
  (0.000) (0.000)     
Note: Table 8 illustrates the results from an Augmented Dicky Fuller test ADF- Fisher Chi square and ADF-
Choi Z-stat for unit root, before and after first differencing. Standard errors are given in parenthesis, level of 
significance is denoted by (10%*, 5%** and 1%***) 
 
Graphical illustration of raw panel data collected for the nine emerging markets is provided in 
figure 1. Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of stationary panel data for all variables collected 
for the emerging markets sample. 
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Figure 1, Raw Data 
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Figure 2, Stationary Data 
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6 Conclusion 
This study assessed the effects that sovereign credit ratings revisions have on interest rates, 
with a focus on emerging market economies. Most research to date has focused on the effects 
of credit ratings; on financial market assets, investments, economic growth, etc. To fill this 
gap in literature, this paper estimated the effects of sovereign credit ratings revisions on 
interest rates, the study adopt a system GMM on panel data and a difference-in-differences in 
our estimation. 
The paper set out by asking two research questions as follows; 
1. What is the effect of changes to sovereign credit ratings and to what extent do these 
 changes affect interest rates in emerging market economies? 
2. Are these effects of sovereign credit rating changes on interest rates asymmetric? 
The study set out to answer these questions by investigating the effects on interest rates 
following ratings revisions. In doing so, the paper takes into consideration other 
macroeconomics factors that influence interest rates as evidenced in the standard open 
economy reaction function suggested by Mohanty and Klau (2004). The study further 
considered various determinants of sovereign credit ratings that were found to be significant 
by Cantor and Parker (1996). This study adopted a similar estimation technique to the one 
employed by Chen et al. (2016) in their estimation of the relationship between ratings 
revisions and economic growth. To ensure robustness of results this study used an average of 
long term sovereign debt rating results from Moody’s and Fitch collected over a 20 year 
period for 9 emerging market economies. The countries were selected from the major global 
regions so as to establish significant estimations that are suitable for the worlds emerging 
market economies. 
According to Chen et al. (2016), sovereign credit ratings are meant to reflect a country’s 
ability to service its financial obligations. Therefore, credit ratings inform investors of a 
country’s default risk, and based on that assertion, investors assume a certain level of 
compensation for taking on such risk. Risk premium is associated with compensation of 
assumed risk on investments. Using a system GMM model, the study estimated the interplay 
between ratings revisions and risk premium, being the channel through which ratings 
revisions affect interest rates. This study found that a one notch positive revision in sovereign 
credit ratings leads to a decrease in risk premium of approximately 0.3%. A one notch 
downgrade on the other hand results in an increase in risk premium of 6%.  
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The study then ran a separate system GMM regression to estimate the effect of ratings 
revisions on nominal interest rates. The findings were that, a one notch positive revision leads 
to an increase in interest rates of approximately 0.958%. The results were contrary to 
literature (Kaminsky and Schumkler 2002; Pukthuanthong-Le et al. 2007 and Chen et al.) 
who suggest that positive ratings revisions lead to a decrease in interest rates. However, it can 
be explained by evidence of outliers in the nominal interest rates data collected for Brazil. 
The South American country experienced high interest rates as a result of contractionary 
measures employed to curb hyperinflation over the sample period. The results obtained 
following downgrades show a significant increase in interest rates of approximately 3.22% 
for a one notch decrease in ratings. The positive sign on the coefficient sign is consistent with 
literature (Kaminsky and Schumkler 2002; Pukthuanthong-Le et al. 2007 and Chen et al.). 
This affirms Kaminsky and Schumkler’s (2002), findings that downgrades can intensify 
negative effects of an economy in recession. 
The study then carried out an alternate estimation excluding Brazil from the panel data used 
in the system GMM model. The results obtained showed that a one notch upgrade 
(downgrade) leads to 0.35% and (0.51%) increase (decrease) in interest rates in emerging 
markets economies. These results were found to correspond with previous findings by 
(Kaminsky and Schumkler 2002; Pukthuanthong-Le et al. 2007 and Chen et al.). and can be 
relied upon for emerging market economies. 
In answering the second research question, the paper provides evidence in the results that 
show that impact of sovereign ratings changes on interest rates are not asymmetric. 
Downgrades in sovereign credit ratings have a larger impact on interest rates in comparison 
to upgrades. In fact, results show that an upgrade in sovereign ratings leads to a minimal 
increase in interest rates. One notch upgrades therefore, yield insignificant benefits in 
reducing cost of capital in emerging market economies. 
As part of future research, it would be interesting to analyse the robustness of the results after 
accounting for further factors such as; financial liberalization, financial crisis, investor 
protection and quality of institutions. 
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